The value of 'ignorance' in restoration

Dr. Eugene Turner, Dept. of Oceanography and Coastal Sciences, LSU.Dr. Eugene Turner is a leading wetland scientist working out of the Coastal Ecology Institute at Louisiana State University. In a recent article in the journal Estuaries and Coasts, Dr. Turner argues that three historic coastal land uses in Louisiana - agricultural impoundment, marsh management, and dredging - have all led to catastrophic ecological problems because of their reliance on a knowledge-based world view in which "the intellectual landscape is flattened, the introduction of new ideas is impeded, monitoring and adaptive management is marginalized, risky behaviors continue, and social learning is restricted."

Furthermore, the rush to restore the coastal ecosystem of the state in the wake of Hurricane Katrina is following these same footsteps. Dr. Turner argues for an alternative approach to ecosystem restoration based on embracing our ignorance. We interviewed Dr. Turner about his ideas. 

CM: Can you define the knowledge-based world view and describe in general how it applies to ecosystem restoration?

Dr. Turner: Berry (2008) and the other chapters in Jackson and Vitek (2008) cover this ground in much more detail, in a culturally synthetic way, and with greater insight. But here is an outline:

We can engage in restoration with a primary perspective that emphasizes either a knowledge-based world view (KBWV) or an ignorance-based world view (IBWV). The meaning of "world view" here is the central outlook or perspective characterizing restoration science. The KBWV assumes that we know most of what is needed to be known, that knowledge is finite, and anticipates that finality can be achieved. Bacon and Descartes, for example, embraced a KBWV through reductionism and assumed that the expansion of knowledge would create a global Garden of Eden by virtue of fully-informed technological advances applied to an unruly Nature. The KBWV is not so worried about what is not known, but how to apply what is known in the right way.

The IBWV, in contrast, emphasizes what we do not know, assumes that it is a large proportion of what might be known, and that there is much that will not be known. Further, the IBWV anticipates that the expansion of knowledge in multiple areas of inquiry introduces additional complexity, if only because of the unseen and unexplored interactions between areas, with the effect that ignorance increases exponentially.  As the saying goes, "the more we learn, the more we learn that we understand less and less". The IBWV, therefore, actively seeks new knowledge.  Wendell Berry (1982) reminds us that "Acting on the basis of ignorance, paradoxically, requires one to know things, remember things for instance, that failure is possible, that error is possible, that second chances are desirable."

The KBWV is more like hunting for a missing key piece of information, whereas the IBWV is about gathering information. The KBWV assumes almost all information is known, which has some arrogance to it, whereas the IBWV has more respect for humility - a diagnostic trait of scientific scrutiny (but not necessarily scientists). Experiments are an exercise in doubt; they test presumed conclusions in ways that have meaningful outcomes, whether we like that outcome or not. The practice of science, in other words, formally embraces doubt, although the practitioners are not immune to a tendency to avoid doubt. Kuhn (1987) warned against irrationally constraining ignorance into comfortably defined concepts ("Scientific research is a strenuous and devoted attempt to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education").

We are interested in restoration because conservation has not resulted in a steady state, much less a gain, and we are experiencing a net loss of natural systems.  In the terminology of 'ecological services' there is a net loss in ecosystem services; species are disappearing and habitats are degrading/lost more rapidly than ever, and at a great scale. The cumulative effect of this development was so great that the present epoch is called the Anthropocene (Steffan et al. 2008) starting when humans earnestly succeeded in separating themselves from intimate contact with nature on a daily basis and had a cumulative impact at the global scale. If restoration is to be meaningful, then we must confront the behavior that rests on the cumulative mis-information and mis-diagnosed consequences. I assume that we really wish to avoid the various present and unfolding tragedies.  An antidote to our arrogance and short-sightedness is humility - the central perspective of the IBWV. 

It was Paul Ehrlich who asked, as I recall, how many rivets you wanted an airplane to lose before it needed to be grounded?  Should you fly it with the "hope" that it was safe? Should you ask a non-specialist to check the condition of the rivets?  Should you just "do something" without a full report about the diagnosis and let it take off with a full load of passengers?  No, we don't let that happen because it is an instant and recognizable threat that many would notice. Restoration, however, is not seen in the same way, perhaps because the changes are slower to develop, it is unlikely to make the evening news, and the visual drama is not captured in a sound bite.

CM: You suggest that KBWV in restoration will invariably lead to undesirable consequences. What is it about this approach that lends itself to a bad outcome?

Dr. Turner: I don't think that the KBWV has problems that will inevitably arise. Rather, it is that there are more likely to be additional problems assuming a KBWV instead of the IBWV. Sometimes, for example, things go well because of luck…... just dumb luck. And sometimes we do know pretty much what works, but not "why" it works (or not). The KBWV brings at least two problems to the restoration project.  First there is the arrogance in the assumptions of nearly complete knowledge. Then there is a problem of the industrial management of ecosystems. These two create bureaucratic impediments to noticing problems and even asking questions about a project that is assumed, a priori, to work. 

The absence of a IBWV encourages incomplete monitoring of success and failure, minimizes chances for an explanation, minimizes social learning, and misses opportunities to be more efficient with limited resources.  The responsibility for success is also minimized.

Modern management by the State is usually centralized by administrative scale and organization. Here are two quotes from others about the problems of centralization:

a) Kenneth Boulding formulated one view of the basis of diseconomies of overall scale in the following words: "There is a great deal of evidence that almost all organizational structures tend to produce false images in the decision-maker, and that the larger and more authoritarian the organization, the better the chance that its top decision-makers will be operating in purely imaginary worlds. This perhaps is the most fundamental reason for supposing that there are ultimately diminishing returns to scale."

b) Berry (2008) writes, "We identify arrogant ignorance by its willingness to work on too big a scale, and thus to put too  much at risk. It fails to foresee bad consequences not only because some of the consequences of all acts are inherently unforeseeable, but also because the arrogantly ignorant are blinded by money invested; they cannot afford to foresee bad consequences."

A recent example is, perhaps, the unexpected economic problems experienced throughout the world.  Regulatory oversight was minimized because of the false assumption that the financial institutions were more stable than they were. Concept, in other words, trumped data. 


 

CM:  In your paper, you focus on large-scale projects in Louisiana - specifically river diversions and a proposed expansion of hurricane protection levees into wetlands. How widespread do you think the KBWV approach is with smaller-scale wetland restoration?  Can you give an example?

Dr. Turner: The very nature of small-scale projects is that the attribution of success is also small and monitoring/science budgets are seldom part of the program. As a result, we don't learn from them. Here are two examples: Wetland mitigation is often about projects less than 2 acres and the record of success is not good at the national scale (Turner et al. 2001; National Research Council 2001) A review of stream restoration project showed that they were very numerous, but that monitoring was seldom done (Bernhardt et al. 2005).

CM: You attribute the tendency towards a KBWV approach in the Louisiana examples to the scale of the effort and bureaucracy involved, as well as a "do something, do anything" mentality. This sounds very similar to our situation here in California with the Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta issues. Do you think IBWV is possible in these situations, and if so, how?

Dr. Turner: Absolutely. The CALFED program is an attempt to fold science into the restoration program, but I don't have personal knowledge about how well that is working (or not). A similar effort is underway in the Everglades, where there are so many blue-ribbon panels involved that it seems it is not going so well, and the state has  now assumed greater responsibility than the federal government. Larger programs have problems that come with project scale, of course (discussed in my article). Flexibility is not a substitute for irresponsible oversight, but allowing for some regional and local  independence is one way to reduce the negative consequences of the  control-and-command nature of large projects. A parallel example might be how city councils have come to agreements about climate change initiatives that have not been done at the global scale.


 

CM: What general advice would you give to a land trust with a staff of 3 working on their first wetland restoration project on how to take an IBWV approach?

 

Dr. Turner:

(a)  Assume that key pieces of information are missing and may not be revealed (ever);  

(b)  Because of the collective and respected ignorance, be flexible in how to develop, evaluate and apply new information and perspectives; learn how to create the context for that situation;

(c) Include many small steps that are addressed in multiple ways; 

(d) Let data trump concepts, not the reverse. If "the bigger, the better" is the operating model, then the model is likely to be superficially abstract (this is not to dispute the need for hierarchy or a division of labor);

(e) Assume that surprises will occur;

(f) Develop exit strategies, including how to reverse interventions;

(g) Do no harm; do not implement plans that will be irreversible if they go awry; If irreversible outcomes are anticipated, then start with the smallest plans, not the largest ones. 

(h)  Ask questions, be persistent, design measurable metrics of success, and use the monitoring results. 

CM: Can you give some examples of wetland restoration projects developed with an IBWV approach?

Dr. Turner: The very nature of the IBWV is that we learn what NOT to do,  and modify accordingly. The success of projects based on a IBWV do not often reveal the process leading to progress, which is a learning process. The failures are not "good copy" and can be misunderstood when written up in the local paper as wasted money, when the truth is that a lot can be learned from unexpected outcomes. 

Second, a solid framework for restoration rests on the IBWV, but may not be explicitly folded into the specific restoration program. We learn about the validity of various aspects by a meta-analysis of many projects, from analysis of many separately funded projects, or from synthetic analyses. Some recommended recent restoration ecology texts: (Falk et al. 2006) and (Hobbs and Suding 2009).

An example, Delaware Bay wetland restoration. A variety of experiments failed in this now-successful wetland restoration project in Delaware Bay. About 7,000 acres are being restored as the levees of former agricultural fields were removed and tidal hydrology re-established. There were experiments in modeling, attempts to remove the invasive plant, Phragmites sp. by spraying with a herbicide, grazing by goats, and disking the marsh to cut Phragmites roots. 

CITATIONS
Berry, W. 2008.  The Way of Ignorance, 37-49, In:  The Virtues of Ignorance B. Vitek and W. Jackson (Ed.). 2008.  Univ. Press of Kentucky.

Bernhardt, E., et al. and 24 co-authors. 2005. Synthesizing U.S. river restoration efforts. Science 308: 636-637

Compensating for Wetland Losses Under the Clean Water Act. National Research Council. National Academy Press, Washington, D.C. 322 pp. 2001.

Falk, D.A., M. A. Palmer and J. B. Zedler 2006.  Foundations of Restoration Ecology.  Society for Ecological Restoration International, Island Press. 364 pp. 

Hobbs,  R. J. and K. N. Suding (Eds.) 2009. New Models of Ecosystem Dynamics and Restoration. Island Press.

Kuhn, T. S. 1987.  The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Univ. Chicago Press.

Steffen, W., P. J. Crutzen and J. R. McNeill 2008. The Anthropocene: Are humans now overwhelming the great forces of Nature? Ambio 36: 614-621.
Vitek, B., and W. Jackson (Eds.). 2008.

Turner, R. E., A. M. Redmond, and J. B. Zedler 2001. Count it by acres or function--Mitigation adds up to net loss of wetlands. National Wetland Newsletter Nov./Dec. 5-6, 14-16; National Research Council (Panel Member) 2001.

Weinstein et al. 1997. Success criteria and adaptive management for a large-scale wetland restoration project.  Wetlands Ecology and Management 4: 1111-127.

Turner, R. (2009). Doubt and the Values of an Ignorance-Based World View for Restoration: Coastal Louisiana Wetlands Estuaries and Coasts, 32 (6), 1054-1068 DOI: 10.1007/s12237-009-9214-4